We find evidence that new CEOs manipulate real business activities -but not accounting accruals -to manage earnings downward relative to established CEOs.
Introduction
Anecdotal evidence suggests that new CEOs have strong incentives to give earnings a "big bath" (manage earnings downwards), blaming the initial losses on their predecessors and enjoying a clean run of future earnings growth. Earnings can be managed through both accruals and real business activities (Graham et al. (2005) 2 . In the post-SOX environment, managers increasingly manage earnings through real business activities instead of accruals because the former is more difficult to detect (Cohen et al. 2008) . A number of studies have investigated accruals-based earnings management around CEO changes (Pourciau 1993; Wells 2002; Reitenga and Tearney 2003; Geiger and North 2011) . To the best of our knowledge, no study to date has considered real earnings management around CEO changes in US firms. Our study investigates both real and accruals-based earnings management around CEO changes in all CRSP/Compustat firms from 2005 to 2012 using quarterly data. We obtain CEO turnover information from Audit Analytics, which record all executive and officer change information in 8-k filings from 2005 onwards. We compare earnings management variables in CEO change firm-quarters with those in normal firm-quarters (hereafter established CEO firm-quarters) and present evidence that new CEOs use real activities, but not accrual-based methods, to manage earnings downwards. Controlling for firm characteristics we find that evidence of real earnings management appears as early as the transition quarter. Consistent with the notion that managers can manage earnings by manipulating business activities continuously throughout a fiscal period, we show that the degree of real earnings management in the transition quarter is positively related to the number of days a new CEO is at the helm in that quarter.
2 Accelerating sales via discounting or delaying discretionary expenditure are examples of upward earnings management through real business activities. Examples of accrual-based earnings management include over-provision for restructuring costs or bad debts; these provisions can be reversed in the future to give a boost to earnings.
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Previous studies find that earnings management is more pronounced for nonroutine CEO changes (Pourciau 1993; Wells 2002) . Both Pourciau (1993) and Wells (2002) note that their findings in relation to non-routine CEO turnover may be due to differences in firm performance between routine and non-routine CEO turnovers; however their small samples precludes directly controlling for firm performance. We find that the difference in earnings management between routine and non-routine CEO changes are no longer significant once we control for firm performance. Similar to earlier studies, we find that non-routine CEO change firms have significantly lower market capitalisations and ROAs than firms experiencing routine CEO changes. In addition, non-routine CEO change firms are more conservative in financial reporting (as measured by the CSCORE measure of Khan and Watts, 2009 ) than firms experiencing routine CEO changes.
The above discussion compares new and outgoing CEO firm-quarters to established firm-quarters. When we compare new CEO firm-quarters directly against outgoing CEO firm-quarters, we find that new CEOs use more earnings decreasing discretionary accruals than outgoing CEOs. This difference is driven by routine CEO changes and may well be a result of upward earnings management by outgoing CEOs in anticipation of their retirement (consistent with Reitenga and Tearney, 2003) .
Nonetheless, neither upwards accruals earnings management by outgoing CEOs nor downwards accruals earnings management by new CEOs are significantly different from the established CEO benchmark. Hence statistically speaking, we cannot attribute the difference in accruals earnings management between new CEOs and outgoing CEOs specifically to either group. Turning to real earnings management, new CEOs record more earning decreasing abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenditures, but in this case the difference can be traced to non-routine CEO changes rather than routine CEO changes. Dechow et al. (2010) point out that measures of earnings management are noisy. Noisy measures constrain the power of statistical tests. One solution to this problem is to enlarge the sample size. Our sample includes 2,495 executive turnover events and averages over 300 per annum, and thus covers a wider range of U.S. firms than any of the prior studies on CEO turnover and earnings management. We also use 4 a number of different models to estimate earnings management. The main results in this paper are based on earnings management measures estimated from industryquarter cross-sectional regressions. However our main findings remain qualitatively the same when we use time-series models to estimate earnings management variables.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature. In section 3 we develop hypotheses. Section 4 introduces data and methodology. Section 5 presents our results and section 6 concludes.
CEO turnover, earnings management and firm performance: existing literature
We focus on CEO turnover, an event which creates an environment with strong incentives for earnings management for both outgoing and incoming CEOs. In the past decade, a number of studies has shown that managers use both accrual-based and real activity-based methods to manage earnings (for example, Graham et al. 2005; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012) . Managers manipulate accruals to achieve certain earnings target (Healy 1985; Dechow et al. 1996; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Payne and Robb 2000; Degeorge et al. 1999) . Managers also manage the operational activities of the firm to reach certain earnings targets (Roychowdhury 2006; Barua et al. 2010; Gunny 2005) . Since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation (SOX) in 2002, the incidence of real earnings management have increased while accrual earnings management has declined (Cohen et al. 2008 ). This may be because real earnings management is often more difficult to detect than accrual earnings management (Graham et al. 2005) . Given that accrual and real earnings management may act as substitutes (Zang 2012) it seems prudent to consider both when investigating earnings management. To our knowledge, no other study has previously included real activity-based earnings management when considering CEO turnover events in the U.S. Our study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating both accrual and real earnings management around CEO turnovers from 2005 to 2012 in US firms. Since our data covers the post-SOX period we are able to revisit some of the existing findings in the earnings management literature that predates the change in the regulatory environment due to SOX.
Earnings Management around CEO Turnovers
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Incentives to manage earnings may differ between outgoing and incoming CEOs.
For example, outgoing CEOs may be more likely to engage in income increasing accounting practices to disguise poor performance or to increase their final bonuses (Reitenga and Tearney 2003) . Incoming CEOs can blame losses occurring early in their tenure on their predecessor and so may be more likely to engage in a "big bath" -for instance by engaging in excessive accounting write-downs in order to create hidden reserves that can be used to manage earnings upwards in future years.
The measurement of earnings management around CEO changes is confounded by the fact that firms tend to perform poorly during the period surrounding executive turnovers, particularly if the executive change is non-routine (Coughlan and Schmidt 1985; Warner et al. 1988; Weisbach 1988; Jensen and Murphy 1990) . Measurement errors in earnings management variables are positively correlated with factors correlated with firm performance (Dechow et al. 1995 (Dechow et al. , 1996 Roychowdhury 2006; Guay et al. 1996) . For example, a poorly performing firm may delay discretionary expenditure out of economic necessity rather than to meet an earnings target. Thus, controlling for factors related to firm performance when investigating earnings management is important.
Our study is most closely related to Dechow and Sloan (1991) , Pourciau (1993) , Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) , and most recently Geiger and North (2011). Our study differs from these studies in three main aspects. First, our study is the first to investigate real earnings management around CEO changes in the U.S. As discussed earlier, in this post-SOX environment, examining real earnings management surrounding CEO changes is particularly relevant.
Second, we investigate earnings management around a total of 2,495 CEO changes (for an average of c. 312 per annum). The U.S. study with the largest number of CEO turnover events prior to our study is an influential work from two decades ago by Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) . They examine around 1,000 routine and nonroutine CEO changes from 1971 to 1989 (on average about 50 per year) and attribute changes in R&D, advertising, capital expenditures and accounting accruals to poor performance rather than earnings management. As pointed out by Dechow et al. 6 (2010) , all measures of earnings management are noisy and subject to significant type I and type II errors. The work by Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) and Dechow et al. (2010) demonstrate the importance of controlling for firm performance and related variables in earnings management research. Our larger CEO turnover dataset is significantly more heterogeneous than those of earlier studies which have tended to focus on larger firms only. The wide variety of firms included in our sample allows us to controls for firm performance in a robust manner. Our larger sample size also enhances the statistical power of our tests; an important consideration given that earnings management measures are often noisy. After controlling for ROA, marketto-book, size and CSCORE, we find that new CEOs tend to use operational activities to manage earnings downward.
Third, while previous studies use annual data, we use quarterly data which mitigates the misclassification issue identified by both Pourciau (1993) and Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) . If a CEO is appointed in the first month of the fiscal year, the new CEO can have significant influence over the financial results of the previous year (for which results will not yet have been announced at the time of new CEO's appointment). Evidence outlined by Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) suggests that financial results prior to CEO turnover would be sensitive to this classification. In our study, only the first quarter following a new CEO appointment is a transition quarter.
We define new CEO firm-quarters as the first four quarters following a CEO change and outgoing CEO firm-quarters as the last four quarters prior to a CEO change. In this way, the potential misclassification between outgoing CEO quarters and new CEO quarters is limited to observations in the first quarter following CEO changes. In addition, U.S. executives in listed companies have incentives to manage earnings quarterly rather than annually because domestic issuers are required to report quarterly earnings. If new CEOs wish to manage earnings downward and blame the bad results on their predecessors, shifting the blame in this manner is likely to be more credible in the early months of their tenure. Hence new CEOs may be incentivised to give earnings a bath at the earliest opportunity. Using the higher frequency afforded by quarterly data can thus help us identify behaviour that might not be apparent at the annual frequency. 
Hypotheses
Both departing and new CEOs may have strong incentives to manage earnings. A change in CEO at a firm can take many forms. At the one extreme, a firm may appoint a new CEO who has been groomed for the role over many years in a wellplanned and executed hand-over. At the other extreme, a firm may have to appoint a new CEO at short notice due to an unexpected event such as corporate fraud or the sudden resignation of the current CEO. Hence a distinction is often made between routine and non-routine CEO changes (see Vancil (1987) as cited by Pourciau (1993) ).
One might expect that a routine CEO change would result in greater continuity of strategy and less earnings management than a non-routine CEO change.
However, non-routine CEO changes tend to be prompted by poor performance and following non-routine executive changes, strengthening of corporate governance can result in more conservative financial reporting. This motivates our next two hypotheses: 
Methodology: earnings management measures
Motivated by recent findings that firms use both accruals and real business activities to manage earnings we consider both types of earnings management. Our analysis groups firms into three categories: a) new CEO firm-quarters, b) outgoing CEO firm-quarters and c) established CEO firm-quarters (the benchmark group).
Accrual-based earnings management
Following recent literature (Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2012; Hazarika et al. 2012 ), we use discretionary accruals to proxy for accrual-based earnings management.
Discretionary accruals are the difference between a firm's total accruals and the normal level of accruals. We use the modified Jones model 4 (Jones 1991) as described in Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate the normal level of accruals.
Specifically, we run the following cross-sectional model for each industry-quarter 5 :
is the earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus the operating cash flows in quarter , is the total assets in quarter − 1, ∆ is the change in revenues from the preceding quarter and is gross property, plant, and equipment 6 . We require at least 15 observations for each cross-sectional estimate. (A summary of the estimation results of equation (1) is included in Appendix B.) Normal levels of accruals are then estimated as follow:
where ∆ is the change in accounts receivable. Discretionary accruals ( ) is the difference between total accruals and the fitted normal accruals.
Real activity-based earnings management
Prior studies guide our choice of proxies for real earnings management. Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006) introduce measures to estimate levels of real earnings management. Later studies (Zang 2012; Cohen et al. 2008; Gunny 2005) demonstrate that these proxies capture real earnings management in various contexts.
Following Zang (2012), we focus on earnings management through two types of real 4 In addition to the modified Jones model used in the main text we also considered the original Jones model estimated in the cross-section as well as in time-series. Our main findings remain qualitatively the same. We require a minimum of 15 observations for each estimate in all tests. 5 Industries are classified by two-digit SIC codes. 6 Missing quarterly gross PPE values are filled in by linear interpolation. 12 business activity, namely overproduction and delay of discretionary expenditures, that temporarily inflate earnings (or, under-production and front-loading discretionary expenditures that temporarily deflate earnings) 7 . We discuss each of these two components of real earnings management in more detail below:
(1) Overproduction: Overproduction results in fixed overheads being allocated to a larger number of units and hence has the effect of reducing the cost of goods sold on a per unit basis. The lower cost of goods sold translates into increased earnings in the period that overproduction takes place. However, inventory capacity is limited and this upward earnings management will eventually reverse as running down excess inventory leads to a period of under-production. Conversely, a firm can also underproduce so as to lower earnings in the current period. We estimate the normal level of production cost from operations using the following equation:
where is the sum of cost of goods sold in quarter and the change in inventory from quarter − 1 to . We estimate the normal level of production cost in the crosssection by industry and quarter 8 . The abnormal level of production costs ( _ ) are the regression residuals from estimating equation (3). Low levels of abnormal of production costs indicate that a firm manipulates earnings downwards through underproduction.
7 Like Zang (2012), this study does not examine abnormal cash flows from operations. As pointed out by Roychowdhury (2006) , inflation of earnings through channel stuffing, price discounts and overproduction leads to decreases in cash flows while delaying discretionary expenditures results in increases in cash flows. Thus, the net effect of abnormal cash flows on real earnings management is ambiguous.
(2) Delaying discretionary expenditure: Discretionary expenditure include R&D, advertising and selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenditure. Temporarily reducing discretionary expenditure can inflate earnings in the current period; similarly, front-loading discretionary expenditure can temporarily decrease earnings in the current period. We estimate the normal level of discretionary expenditure from operations using the following equation:
where is discretionary expenditure in quarter t, which include R&D and SG&A 9 . Abnormal discretionary expenditure ( _ ) is the regression residuals from equation (4) multiplied by −1 for ease of interpretation. Thus, lower abnormal discretionary expenditure (as defined) corresponds to downward earnings management through an abnormal increase in discretionary expenditure.
The real earnings management index ( ), is simply the sum of abnormal production costs ( _ ) and abnormal discretionary expenditure ( _ ).
Methodology: Two-way clustered standard errors
Unless otherwise indicated, all panel regressions in this study report -values calculated from standard errors clustered by firm and by quarter, as described by Thompson (2011) and Cameron et al. (2011) . Our use of two-way clustered standard errors are motivated by the findings in Petersen (2009) , and subsequently corroborated by Gow et al. (2010) , that two-way standard errors are generally robust to time and firm dependence in panel data. By contrast, a range of alternative approaches previously employed in finance and accounting applications are shown to 9 We do not include advertising expenditure in discretionary expenditures because COMPUSTAT does not provide quarterly advertising expenditure. Quarterly R&D is calculated using year-to-date R&D expenditures for each quarter. Appendix A provides a detailed description of all the variables used.
give rise to biased standard errors when confronted with panel data that exhibit both time and firm dependence. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the key variables used in this study. The available firm-quarter observations for each variable ranges from 23,382 for restructuring cost to 114,878 for return on assets (ROA). All variables are winsorised at 1% (on both tails) to mitigate the influence of outliers.
Results
5.1.Summary statistics
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
The first four variables in Panel A of Table 2 are measures of accrual-based and real activity-based earnings management 10 . Note, the means of these variables do not equal zero because they have been winsorised at 1% on both tails. At the 25th percentile, the real earnings management index is −0.0504 (that is −5.04% of total assets). At the 25 percentile, quarterly discretionary accruals, abnormal production cost and abnormal discretionary expenditures are −1.87%, −3.26% and −2.12% of total assets respectively. At the 75th percentile, the quarterly real earnings management index is 0.0510 (or 5.10% of total assets) and discretionary accruals, abnormal production cost and abnormal discretionary expenditures are 2.41%, 2.78% and 3.45% of total assets respectively. Once annualised the levels of these measures are comparable to those of other studies (for example, Table 1 , Zang, 2012 ) .
The second group of variables in Panel A of Table 2 are control variables that has been identified (for example, see Dechow et al. 1995 Dechow et al. , 1996 Roychowdhury 2006) as being correlated with the measurement error in earnings management variables. Size, market-to-book ratio and ROA are all standardized by industry-quarter. This is to make them consistent with earnings management measures that are themselves estimated as residuals from industry-quarter regressions. Throughout our analysis, we also control for conservatism in financial reporting, or CSCORE. Some CEO turnovers may be the result of breaches of debt covenants and as such may be followed with increases in financial reporting conservatism, as noted in Tan (2013) .
Since earnings management may be confounded with financial reporting conservatism,
we include a measure of conservatism as a control. The degree of financial reporting conservatism, or CSCORE, is estimated as in Khan and Watts (2009) , using quarterly cross-sectional regressions as specified below:
where is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the quarterly cumulative stock return ( ) for firm is negative, and 0 otherwise. is the natural log of market value of equity of firm . is the market-to-book ratio. is the leverage, defined as total debt over book equity. Following Khan and Watts (2009), we delete firm-quarters with negative total assets or book value of equity and firm-quarters with price per share less than $1. A firm-quarter CSCORE is calculated as + + +
. An increased CSCORE indicates more conservative financial reporting.
Appendix C reports the summary of CSCORE estimation results.
The last four rows in Panel A of Table 2 summarizes selected line items related to earnings management, including special items, gains from PPE sales, cash flows from discontinued operations and restructuring cost, all scaled by sales. The negative means of these variables represent losses or expenses.
Panel B of Table 2 reports pairwise correlation coefficients between key variables.
Firms tend to use accruals and real activities to manage earnings in the same direction in a given quarter, as shown by the positive and significant correlation coefficients between REM and DA and between each of Ab_Prod and Ab_DiscExp and DA.
Control variables are not highly correlated, with correlation coefficients ranging between −0.57 between CSCORE and MB_norm, to 0.02 between MB and size.
Earnings management by outgoing CEOs and new CEOsunivariate analysis
Is there a change in the level of earnings management around CEO turnovers? Do outgoing CEOs and incoming CEOs manage earnings in different directions? Panel A in Table 3 presents descriptive statistics comparing new CEO and outgoing CEO firm-quarters to established CEO firm-quarters. Results from the univariate analysis
in Table 3 appears to suggest that both outgoing CEOs and new CEOs deflate earnings through decreasing discretionary accruals and accelerating discretionary expenditure (the CEO group differences for abnormal production are not significant). The results in Table 3 We also find that new CEOs are on average more conservative in financial reporting than either outgoing or established CEOs. Conservatism is measured using the CSCORE metric of Khan and Watts (2009) . The average CSCORE of new CEO firm-quarters is 0.0305, which is significantly higher than the average CSCORE of either established or outgoing CEO firm-quarters (see the last row of Table 3 ).
Since we are interested in how measures of earnings management evolve around CEO turnover events, it is useful to add a time dimension to our analysis. Panel A in Figure 2 plots the mean of each earnings management variable, for the period beginning four quarters before and ending eight quarters after a CEO change event.
All four charts exhibit a common U-shaped pattern despite some volatility in the quarterly measures. A firm's discretionary accruals, abnormal discretionary expenditures and abnormal production costs all tend to deteriorate in the four quarters prior to a CEO change, followed by a further drop in the first or second quarter immediately after, before reversing somewhat in the subsequent quarters.
We also examine the line items related to accrual-based earnings management.
The first chart in Panel B of Figure 2 provides an overview of the special items around the CEO change event. Special items are relatively stable in the four quarters preceding the CEO change, but large losses from special items occur in the first and second quarter after the CEO change. By contrast, restructuring costs gradually increase before the CEO change and keep increasing for two quarters after the CEO change, before suddenly reversing drastically afterwards. Cash flows from extraordinary and discontinued operations around CEO changes display a pattern similar to that of restructuring costs. In contrast with special items, gains from sales of PPE and investments increase in the first two new CEO quarters, so this line item does not appear to be driving the decreases in discretionary accruals in new CEO quarters. These plots suggest that new CEOs make large write-offs using special items after they take control of the organisation. On the other hand, restructuring efforts may already be underway at the time of CEO turnover.
In Panel C of Figure 2 we consider firm characteristics around CEO turnover. In particular, we plot the mean of firm size, market-to-book ratio, ROA and CSCORE around CEO changes. Firm size, market-to-book ratio and ROA deteriorate quickly in the run-up to a change in CEO and then continue to drop further in the first few quarters after the CEO change event. By contrast the mean of CSCORE gradually rises in the four quarters prior to the CEO change and stabilizes thereafter.
[Insert Table 3 The results of our univariate analysis are consistent with the findings by Pourciau (1993) . Given that CEO turnover is often associated with poor contemporaneous firm performance, it can be difficult to disentangle the impact of CEO turnover from that of firm performance, as also noted by Pourciau (1993) and others. In much of the prior literature the ability to control for firm performance has been constrained by small sample sizes (for instance, Pourciau (1993) considers a sample of 73 nonroutine turnover events in her study). The overall size and cross-sectional depth of our dataset allows us to consider a more heterogeneous set of firms while at the same time specifically controlling for firm performance and financial reporting conservatism.
The results from this multivariate analysis are presented in the next section.
Earnings management by outgoing CEOs and new CEOs -multivariate analysis
According to Dechow et al. (1995 Dechow et al. ( , 1996 , measurement errors in measures of earnings management are correlated with firm characteristics and performance. The presence of measurement error correlated with omitted variables can be a source of bias; in the following analysis we propose to deal with this issue by explicitly controlling for a range of firm characteristics. We test the difference in earnings management levels (H1A and H2A) using panel regressions that incorporate firmlevel controls. The general specification for the panel regression is:
where , the dependent variable, is one of the earnings management measures (that is DA, REM, Ab_DiscExp and Ab_Prod; see Appendix A for further detail). is a vector of control variables that includes the log market value of equity in quarter − 1 ( _ ), the market-to-book ratio in quarter − 1 ( _ ), the return on assets in quarter ( _ ) (following Roychowdhury, 2006 and Zang, 2012) with −values below 0.01 (see the last three columns in Table 4 ). The results are similar when we do not control for CSCORE (see column (3), (4) and (5) in Table 4 ).
Third, while the univariate analysis do not support the notion that outgoing and new
CEOs manage earnings in different directions (except for discretionary accruals), after controlling for firm characteristics and conservatism we have strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that outgoing and new CEOs manage earnings in opposite directions (thus lending support to Hypothesis 2A). This is evidenced by the last row of Table 4 , in which we consider the differences between the slope estimates of the new CEO dummies and the outgoing CEO dummies. All the differences are negative and seven of the eight differences are significant at the 10% level (five out of eight are significant at the 5% level).
For a finer-grained understanding of earnings management we turn to an analysis of individual quarters surrounding the CEO change event. We consider the four quarters leading up to the CEO change as well as the eight quarters following, for a total of twelve quarters. As before, we control for firm characteristics and conservatism -the panel regression is outlined in equation (7) below:
where is a vector of earnings management variables;
_ takes the value of 1 if the financial result cut-off date is quarter(s) away from the date of new CEO change and 0 otherwise.
We plot the slope estimates on the individual quarter dummies in Figure 3 . Other than discretionary accruals, the lines in Figure 3 continue to exhibit U-shapes similar to those in Figure 2 . The discretionary accrual line exhibits a U-shaped curve in Figure 2 but not in Figure 3 , which is consistent with the regression results in Table 4 where discretionary accruals in new CEO quarters are not significantly lower than those of established CEO quarters after controlling for other factors. The most interesting result in Figure 3 is that, after accounting for ROA, MB, size and CSCORE, the real earnings management measures all show dramatic drops when moving from the quarter prior to the CEO change (quarter −1 ) to the quarter following the CEO changes (quarter 1). The pattern in Figure 3 suggests that new
CEOs manage earnings downward as early as in the first quarter after taking control.
In close to or even after the balance sheet date, rather than throughout the fiscal quarter as is the case for real earnings management. In order to test Hypothesis 3A, we estimate the following regressions:
where are measures of accrual-based earnings management and of real earnings management in the first quarter following the CEO change, as defined in Appendix A. [Insert Table 5 about here.]
The coefficient of interest is the slope estimate on the number of days remaining (the first row in Table 5 ). After accounting for the difference in performance and conservatism, REM, Ab_DiscExp and Ab_Prod are all significantly and negatively related to days remaining (column (6) to (8)). By contrast, DA is not significantly related to days remaining. The slope estimate on days remaining in column (6) is −0.0002, suggesting that if the new CEO has 30 more calendar days in his first quarter, the REM on average is −0.0038 lower, or on average there is more downward real earnings management equal to 0.38% of total assets (corresponding to 0.04 of a standard deviation in REM). Thus, the effect of new CEO time at the helm during his first quarter on downward real earnings management is economically significant. These results lend support to our Hypothesis 3A.
5.5.Earnings management for routine and non-routine CEO changes
In order to test Hypothesis 1B and 2B, we categorize CEO turnovers into routine changes and non-routine changes following Pourciau (1993) . We rely on the type of executive change and the reasons given in 8-K filings to classify each turnover as either non-routine or routine. Non-routine CEO turnovers are those for which (1) the CEO is recorded to have retired from the company at an age below 60 and retained no position within the company (2) the CEO resigned and did not retain any position within the company (3) the CEO died (4) the CEO was dismissed (5) the CEO left the company due to corporate restructuring, policy disagreement, investigation or suspected wrong-doing; or (6) the CEO change is followed by a temporary arrangement involving a co-CEO, interim CEO or a CEO that stays for less than a year.
[Insert Table 6 In Table 6 Panel A we also consider the difference in firm characteristics between routine and non-routine changes. Firms experiencing non-routine CEO turnovers have lower market capitalisation, market-to-book ratios and ROAs on average than firms experiencing routine CEO turnovers. These differences in firm characteristics are significant at the 1% level in every case (save for the market-to-book ratio in the case of outgoing CEOs which is significant at the 10% level). These results support Hypothesis 1B that non-routine CEO change firms have lower ROA, size, market-tobook but higher CSCORE. Such differences again underscore the need to control for firm performance rather than relying only on univariate analyses.
Consistent with the approach of the previous sections we use a panel regression to investigate earnings management around routine CEO changes and non-routine CEO changes while controlling for size, market-to-book ratio, ROA and CSCORE.
Specifically, we run panel regressions for each earnings management measure using equation (9) Panel B in Table 6 reports the results for regressions as specified in equation (9). We have three interesting findings regarding earnings management around routine and non-routine CEO changes after controlling for firm performance. Table 6 ), which suggest that new CEOs, regardless of whether they take over following routine or non-routine executive changes, do not systematically use accruals to manage earnings downward.
This result stands in contrast to the findings of earlier studies that downward earnings management by new CEOs are stronger in non-routine CEO change firms than they are in routine CEO change firms (Pourciau 1993; Wells 2002) . In addition to a later sample period and a larger sample size, our study employs a different research design that employs quarterly data and controls for ROA, MB, size and CSCORE using panel regressions. We believe that our research design addresses the concern, noted by Pourciau (1993) , that early results may be influenced by poor firm performance around CEO turnovers. In addition, our use of quarterly data mitigates to some extent a concern associated with using annual financial data, which is the potential miss-classification of annual financial results as being influenced by the new CEOs rather than the outgoing CEO or vice versa.
Second, regardless of whether the executive change is routine or non-routine, new
CEOs (but not outgoing CEOs) use real activities to manage earnings downward, as suggested by the significant and negative slope estimates on routine new CEO dummies and on non-routine new CEO dummies in column (3) to (8) in Panel B of Table 6 . For example, the slope estimate on the non-routine new CEO dummy is −0.0102 in column (6), suggesting that REM in non-routine new CEO quarters averages 0.0102 (or, 1.02% of total assets) less than those in established CEO quarters. Similarly, REM in routine new CEO quarters on average is 0.0055 (or 0.55% of total assets) less than those in established CEO quarters.
Finally, in non-routine CEO change quarters and routine CEO change quarters, discretionary accruals, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenditures are very similar and not significantly different. The differences between slope coefficients on the non-routine new CEO dummies ( × ) and those on the routine new CEO dummies ( × ), shown on the last two rows in Panel B of Table 6 , are consistently insignificant at conventional significance levels. Results from multivariate panel regressions suggest that, after controling for firm performance, we have no evidence to support the hypothesis that levels of earnings management around non-routine executive changes differ from those around routine executive turnovers.
The last two rows in Panel B of Table 6 report differences in means of DA and REM in new CEO quarters and outgoing CEO quarters. New CEOs following routine changes tend to incur significantly more negative DA but not REM than outgoing
CEOs. This finding does not support the Hypothesis 2B that downward earnings management is stronger among non-routine new CEOs than among routine new CEOs.
However, this result is consistent with Reitenga and Tearney (2003) who also find upward earnings management before CEOs retire accorrding to plan. By contrast, new
CEOs after non-routine changes tend to record significantly more negative REM, Ab_Prod and Ab_DiscExp (but not DA) than outgoing CEOs. This result supports Hypothesis 2B.
Conclusion
Our study is the first to provide evidence that new CEOs in U.S. companies manage earnings downwards through real earnings management, both in comparison to established CEOs and outgoing CEOs, after controlling for firm performance. By contrast we do not find significant evidence that outgoing CEOs engage in real earnings management after controlling for firm performance. There is a statistically significant difference in discretionary accruals between new CEOs and outgoing
CEOs after controlling for firm characteristics; however neither new nor outgoing
CEOs engage in significant accruals earnings management in comparison to established CEOs (again after controlling for firm performance). As such we cannot specifically attribute the difference in discretionary accruals between new and outgoing CEOs to accruals earnings management by either new or outgoing CEOs.
Another novel finding in our study is that downwards real earnings management by new CEOs start very early in the new CEO's tenure, and is significant even in the transition quarter. We demonstrate statistically and economically significant linear relationship between the degree of downwards real earnings management and the length of new CEO tenure in the transition quarter. Our study benefits from a much larger and more diverse sample of CEO change firms than has been the norm in earlier studies. This allows us to control for firm performance without causing a significant loss of power in our tests. In addition, we make use of quarterly data instead of annual data -this allows us to make a much sharper distinction between earnings influenced by new versus outgoing CEOs.
Figure 1 Financial results cut-off dates for accrual-based and real-activity-based earnings management
This figure depicts financial results cut-off dates for accrual-based earnings management and real activity-based earnings announcement along a time line. The cut-off date represents the last date at which earnings management could theoretically take place. For accrual-based earnings management, the cut-off date is the earnings announcement date. For measures of real-activity-based earnings announcement (the REM index, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenditures) the cut-off date is the balance sheet date. Appendix A includes a detailed description of variables. We start with a sample that includes all "CEO" officer appointment events from Audit Analytics. In order to obtain the sample used in this study, we implemented the following steps:
(1) The sample excludes appointments of a CEO to additional positions on the board, appointments of CEOs in a subsidiary only and a CEO returning to previous positions after a short leave. After step one, we have 11,367 CEO appointment events.
(2) CEO appointments due to bankruptcy and mergers and acquisitions are deleted from the sample.
(3) Co-CEO appointments are usually temporary arrangements before the company finds a permanent CEO; hence, all co-CEO appointments are deleted from the sample.
(4) Repeat appointment of the same person to the CEO position after the previous contract expires is also filed in 8-K and recorded in Audit Analytics. Our sample excludes these repeat appointments of the same person.
(5) Analysis of the effects of CEO turnovers rely on data through four quarters before and through four quarters after the CEO change; therefore, in order to obtain a clear effect of CEO turnovers, we exclude incoming CEOs who did not stay in the position at least for one year.
(6) We eliminate firms in regulated industries (SIC codes between 4400 and 4900) and banks and financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999).
(7) We merge CEO turnover events from Audit Analytics with merged CRSP/Compustat file on CIK.
Panel B summarises CEO turnover events by year. Panel C summarises CEO turnover events by industry group as defined by 11 first-level SIC industry groups.
A.
( 
where are measures of accrual-based earnings management and of real earnings management, as defined in Appendix A. is a vector of control variables that include the log market value of equity in quarter − 1 ( _ ), the market-to-book ratio in quarter − 1 ( _ ), the return on assets in quarter ( _ ) and CSCORE in quarter .
is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for new CEO firm-quarters, and 0 otherwise. is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for outgoing CEO firm-quarters, and 0 otherwise. New CEO firm-quarters are firm-quarters with CEOs who have been at the helm for no more than four quarters before the financial cut-off date. Outgoing CEO firm-quarters are firm-quarters with CEOs who are no longer CEOs within four quarters from the financial cut-off date. The final cutoff date for DA is the earnings announcement date and for REM, Ab_Prod and Ab_DiscExp is the balance sheet date. The intercept measures the average level of these earnings management variables for firm-quarters with established CEOs. The sample period runs from 2005 to 2012. Asterisks ***, ** and * next to a coefficient estimate indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. -values are calculated from standard errors clustered by firm and by quarter (Thompson, 2011) . 
where are measures of accrual-based earnings management and of real earnings management in the first quarter following CEO changes, as defined in Appendix A. is a vector of control variables that include the log market value of equity in quarter − 1 ( _ ), the market-to-book ratio in quarter − 1 ( _ ), the return on assets in quarter ( _ ) and CSCORE in quarter . The equation does not have an intercept because we expect earnings management levels to be zero if the new CEO takes over on the financial cut-off date. The sample includes all new CEO first quarter observations, from 2005 to 2012, for which we have the necessary inputs to estimate earnings management variables. Asterisks ***, ** and * next to a coefficient estimate indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. -values are calculated from heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Production costs, the dependent variable in the regressions specified as question (3). is the sum of the cost of goods sold in quarter (cogsq) and the change in inventory (invtq) from − 1 to . DiscExp Discretionary expenditures, the dependent variable in the regressions specified as question (4). the sum of R&D and SG&A expenditures (xsgaq).
R&D
Research and development expenditures in the second, third and fourth fiscal quarter is the difference between year-to-date R&D ended in each quarter (xrdy) and that ended in the previous quarter; quarterly R&D in the first fiscal quarter equals to the year-to-date R&D. Lev
Leverage is the ratio of total debt (dlcq+dlttq) to market value of equity (prcc ×cshoq).
Size
Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (prc). MB Market value of equity (prcc ×cshoq) to book equity value of a firm (ceqq).
